No, Messi Was Not in Danger of Being Assassinated at the World Cup
Lionel Messi was named in two threats during the 2026 World Cup. But the public record shows no killers, no weapons and no real plot, only claims that became ever more exaggerated.
On 27 June, hours before Argentina played Jordan in Dallas, a man telephoned Dallas airport with a terrifying warning.
He claimed that he and two accomplices were travelling towards the stadium carrying homemade bombs and an AR-15. They planned to attack police officers and players from both teams, he said, singling out Lionel Messi. Argentina nevertheless played that evening, beating Jordan 3-1 in their final group match.
Ten days later, another threat appeared before Argentina faced Egypt in Atlanta. An account on X claimed its owner was about to enter the stadium with four bombs strapped to his body and kill Messi. During the match on 7 July, police received a separate telephone warning that three bombs had been placed inside rubbish bins in the stadium. Explosives officers and detection dogs searched the venue. They found nothing.
The incidents became public one month later.
The headlines immediately became fantastical.
US Stopped Multiple Plots to Assassinate Lionel Messi During the 2026 World Cup, Police Report Says
Messi faced terror threats during FIFA World Cup 2026; leaked police document reveals plot to blow up footballer
What actually happened
The story began with an investigation published on 7 August by Spanish crime reporter Luis Rendueles.
Rendueles had obtained daily reports produced by the International Police Cooperation Center (IPCC), the multinational command centre through which US agencies and police officers from participating countries exchanged information during the World Cup.
In April, the FBI told the US Senate that it would manage the IPCC, with officers from 46 countries sharing real-time information about matches, fan events and other security incidents. The centre worked alongside an FBI intelligence hub which collected and circulated World Cup threat reports.
Its daily summaries therefore provide a valuable record of what security services were dealing with during the tournament. They include threats against players, stalking incidents, attempts to approach teams, online abuse and warnings concerning stadiums.
But they are operational summaries: records of information received and action taken during a live security operation. Rendueles did not report that he had obtained the completed investigations into the people behind the Messi threats. Nor did the FBI release a report announcing that it had captured assassins or disrupted attacks.
The Dallas report recorded what an unknown caller said: that he had two accomplices, that they possessed homemade bombs and an AR-15, and that they were travelling towards the stadium to attack police officers and players.
While those details are alarming, they all came from the caller.
The published account does not say that police found the supposed accomplices, intercepted a vehicle or recovered a rifle, explosives or bomb-making materials. It does not name the caller, describe an arrest or say whether investigators established that he was anywhere near the stadium.
It is possible that authorities identified him and have not disclosed the result. But the public record currently takes the story only as far as the telephone call.
The same problem applies to Atlanta.
Before Argentina played Egypt on 7 July, an X user reportedly threatened to enter Atlanta Stadium with four bombs attached to his body and kill Messi. The post described a would-be attacker, explosives, a target and an apparently imminent attack. Once again, none of those details was independently established in the reports subsequently published.
No account identifies the user, places him at the stadium or says that explosives were found in his possession. There has been no publicly disclosed arrest or criminal charge arising from the post.
During the match, a different person telephoned police and claimed that three bombs had been hidden in rubbish bins around the stadium. Explosives officers and detection dogs searched the venue. They found nothing.
Once the incidents are combined, however, they form an apparently convincing sequence: A man threatens to enter the stadium wearing bombs. Explosives teams sweep the venue. The attack fails.
That is not quite what the reports show. They show that police received two separate warnings, treated them seriously and found no explosives.
The evidence therefore supports a serious but narrower account of what happened. Messi was explicitly named in at least two threats during the World Cup. A third person made a separate bomb threat against a stadium in which he was playing. US authorities investigated the warnings and conducted at least one physical search.
What the evidence does not establish is that anybody built a bomb, acquired a rifle, assembled accomplices, travelled towards either stadium or took any other practical step towards killing Messi.
The threats were real. As far as is currently known, the plots were not.
How a threat became a plot
The story grew through small changes in language.
Rendueles’s original investigation carefully attributed the claims about the weapons and accomplices to the people making the threats. He did not report that officers had intercepted gunmen, recovered weapons or arrested an assassination team. But that distinction began to disappear as the story travelled.
On 8 August, La Gazzetta dello Sport published the headline “Messi attack foiled, police report reveals plot”. Its article called Messi “the primary target of a terrorist plot” and the Dallas threat an “elaborate plan.”
The Hindustan Times then reported that a leaked document had revealed a plot to blow up Messi. It described the Dallas caller and his alleged accomplices as “carrying homemade bombs and an AR-15.”
That was what the caller claimed. The available reports do not establish that police ever saw those weapons or confirmed that the accomplices existed.
By 9 August, Colombia One was reporting that the United States had stopped “multiple plots to assassinate Lionel Messi” and that the threats had been “neutralized.”
The transformation was complete. Several unrelated communications had become multiple assassination plots. The authorities’ response to the threats had become evidence that they had stopped the resulting attacks.
The documents also acquired greater official weight in the retelling. Internal daily security reports obtained by a journalist became a “leaked police dossier” and then an American police report revealing completed investigations. Some accounts suggested that US authorities had released the findings themselves.
They had not. The FBI has not publicly released the documents, identified the people behind the threats or announced that it disrupted an attempt to kill Messi.
What an actual sports plot looks like
The same period provides a useful comparison.
Before the UFC Freedom 250 event at the White House on June 14, US investigators uncovered what the Justice Department describes as a coordinated plan to attack the event and kill government officials and other attendees.
In that case, investigators identified alleged conspirators and obtained their communications. They found weapons, ammunition, body armour and tactical equipment. The group allegedly discussed explosive-laden drones, snipers, targets and escape plans. Members were assigned roles, trained and arranged travel. Eight men were indicted on terrorism-support and murder-conspiracy charges.
Those defendants have not been convicted and the allegations must still be proved. But the case shows why authorities use the word plot: investigators allege that identifiable people communicated, obtained resources, allocated roles and took practical steps towards violence.
Nothing comparable has been disclosed in relation to Messi.
It remains possible that investigators identified one or both authors and have withheld details. Protective-security agencies do not publish every assessment, and the absence of public evidence cannot prove that no private intelligence exists.
The bureau’s public post-tournament accounts also make no mention of such a case. Its San Francisco field office’s summary, for example, said matches and fan events in its area concluded without any significant security incident and described the bureau’s work as investigating suspicious activity, evaluating information and mitigating threats.
While we wait for proof, there is no reason to pass the time by inventing assassins.