Countries around the world are trying to bring illegal betting to heel. This summer, India appeared to have gone with a familiar approach. A High Court tells internet providers which sites to block, and the government passes on the order. On 21 July and 2 September 2026, India’s Department of Telecommunications told providers to block a total of 129 sites accused of offering illegal betting.
One small wrinkle, however. The court orders were fake.
What happened?
The first order landed on July 19. The sender called themselves “Aryan Chaudhary”, claimed to be a lawyer and attached a convincing Rajasthan High Court order giving officials 24 hours to act.
Two days later, the department sent internet providers the list of 34 betting sites to block. But when Reuters later tried writing to the address the order had come from, the message bounced.
The second order covered nearly three times as many sites. Dated 14 August and emailed to officials on 22 August, it carried the name of a sitting Allahabad High Court judge, Justice Garima Prashad. It accused 95 sites of running betting operations and unauthorised streams of Indian Premier League cricket, including posing as real betting sites such as 1xBet, Parimatch and Lotus365.
Again, Internet providers were told to block access immediately.
But the story began to unravel on 30 October, when Reuters correspondent Munsif Vengattil asked the court in Allahabad whether its order was real. It wasn’t.
Two weeks ago, Uttar Pradesh police opened an investigation into suspected forgery and cheating.
How did the fake orders get through?
The July order reached India’s telecom department by email on 19 July 2026. It appeared to come from the Rajasthan High Court, cited a law that allows the government to block websites on national security grounds and gave officials 24 hours to act. The department sent its instructions to internet providers on 21 July. The September block followed a longer paper trail, and the department published the emails that show how it came about. www.reuters.com
The second fake ruling was dated 14 August. It reached the department eight days later, on 22 August, in an email from someone who said he was the petitioner’s lawyer. On 24 August, the department’s law division forwarded the ruling for action, recording that the sender had supplied only the order. The petition that supposedly explained who was asking for the block and why was missing. On 27 August, the law division asked what action had been taken. On 28 August, a telecom official went back to the sender for an Excel list of the 95 addresses, explaining that copying them out of the PDF could introduce errors. The department issued its blocking instruction on 2 September. askspinner.com
There was also a way to check the ruling itself. The PDF carried a QR code of the sort used to verify court documents. When Reuters scanned the code, it led to a page that simply repeated the case number printed on the PDF. The published emails record a check on which addresses the department was about to block. They contain no request to the Allahabad High Court to confirm that it had ordered the block in the first place.
Why did nobody spot it?
The first order, in the name of the Rajasthan High Court, was convincing in look, tone and demands. It gave officials 24 hours to act. It invoked a provision of India’s IT law that allows the government to block websites on national security grounds, and it bore a blue seal with India’s national emblem. The sender claimed to be an advocate-on-record, a lawyer authorised to file cases.
But te second order left a fuller paper trail.
By 24 August 2026, the supposed Allahabad ruling had reached the department’s law division. An official forwarded it for action, but recorded that the sender had omitted the petition, which would have set out who was asking for the block and why.
On 27 August, the division asked what action had been taken. The following day, a telecom official went back to the sender and asked for the addresses “in editable Excel format, preferably with one URL per row”. This was not because of suspicion, the official wanted to avoid introducing errors when copying them from the PDF.
The attachment had a QR code of the kind courts use to authenticate rulings. But when Reuters scanned the code, it opened a page that simply repeated the case number printed on the document.
Despite these multiple failsafes, the orders were convincing enough to be acted upon.
Why would anyone do this?
Online gambling is banned across India. Gambling in person depends on where you are.
India’s constitution puts betting and gambling under state jurisdiction, which is why Goa can license casino gambling, including on offshore vessels.
The national online gaming law, which came into force on 1 May 2026, applies across state lines and to operators abroad serving players in India. It bans offering online games played for money, whether the outcome depends on skill or chance, and bars companies from advertising them or processing payments for them.
Blocking a website is the main way to enforce that ban. India’s central government already blocked 1,524 sites and apps linked to betting and gambling between 2022 and 2025. Indian states can make their own suchr orders. In August, Manipur’s telecom department ordered the blocking of 16 domains.
The same machinery also gets used to protect television rights. In September, 2026, broadcaster JioStar obtained a court order in Delhi against sites accused of streaming cricket without permission. The order allowed JioStar to identify further addresses carrying the same content, provided it brought them before the court. In November, JioStar’s lawyer sent more such addresses to be blocked.
That helps explain why the fake Allahabad order was so believable. A lawyer sending over a list of websites in a cricket piracy case was something officials already dealt with.
Now, why would someone bother sending fake orders to block sites when India is already blocking so many?
We don’t have an answer yet.
For a rival bookmaker, the potential payoff is straightforward. If customers can’t reach their usual site and go looking for somewhere else to bet, another operator has a chance to pick up their deposits. But a blocked address is a poor proxy for a bookmaker put out of business.
On 2 March 2026, India’s financial crime agency said 1xBet used multiple mirror sites in India. A customer shut out of one address might move to another run by the same operator.
So why unblock the sites on 13 November if they were offering illegal bets? The department’s letter gives no reason, but it refers specifically to the 2 September directive, whose stated basis was a ruling the Allahabad High Court had never issued.
On 13 November, the block on all affected sites was lifted, including those carrying the brand names of Fairplay, Lotus365 and Reddybook.


