The independent commission found that City used sham commercial arrangements to inflate revenue and reduce costs, filed misstated accounts, significantly breached Premier League and UEFA spending limits and failed to cooperate fully with the league’s investigation. City has appealed the ruling, arguing that it contains material errors of law, principle and fact and maintaining that it possesses “irrefutable evidence” supporting its position.

If the core findings survive that appeal, a serious sporting sanction is difficult to avoid. The current Premier League rules allow the commission to deduct points, suspend a club from matches, impose an unlimited fine, order compensation and recommend expulsion from the league. The commission can combine those sanctions or impose another penalty it considers appropriate.

There are two routes by which City could leave the Premier League.

A points deduction could push them into the bottom three, producing ordinary relegation to the Championship. Alternatively, the commission could recommend that City be expelled from Premier League membership, which would require a separate vote of the league’s clubs.

Those routes have very different likelihoods.

A points deduction is the realistic route to relegation

The simpler option is for the commission to impose a very large points deduction and allow the league table to decide City’s fate.

Premier League commissions already use points deductions for financial breaches. Everton initially lost ten points for exceeding permitted losses before an appeal reduced the sanction to six. Nottingham Forest received a four-point deduction in another PSR case.

Those precedents establish the principle that financial-rule breaches can justify punishment on the pitch. They are much less useful for calculating City’s sentence.

Everton and Forest overspent within particular assessment periods. City’s case covers nine seasons and involves findings that the club misstated both income and expenditure, concealed the true source of sponsorship funds and then used those figures to demonstrate compliance with spending rules.

The commission therefore does not have a neat precedent telling it that a particular amount of disguised funding equals a particular number of points.

Nor would simply multiplying Everton’s deduction produce a credible answer. City were found guilty under several different rules, covering different behaviour and different seasons. The commission will have to decide how those offences fit together and what punishment is proportionate to the overall conduct.

Relegation would be an unprecedented punishment o

A points deduction can be enormous without actually relegating Manchester City.

The Premier League’s own analysis shows that the club finishing 18th has historically tended to collect somewhere in the mid-30s. A City side otherwise capable of earning 80 or 90 points could therefore require a deduction of 40 points or more before Championship football became likely.

That is vastly beyond the sanctions imposed on Everton or Forest.

There is nevertheless a serious argument for going far beyond those cases.

The commission concluded that the club had presented an inaccurate financial picture over years and that those figures affected whether City appeared compliant with both Premier League and UEFA restrictions. The league has said the arrangements produced more than £900 million in overstated revenue or understated costs across the relevant period.

A fine presents an even greater problem. Punishing one of football’s wealthiest clubs by asking it to pay money would have limited sporting effect, particularly when the underlying case concerns the financial resources available to build and maintain a successful team.

The strongest argument for relegation is therefore not that another club once lost six points and City’s offences were larger. It is that the commission may decide only a very substantial sporting sanction can adequately address conduct that distorted financial compliance over almost a decade.

A huge deduction short of relegation remains easier to justify

Suppose the commission decides 30 points properly reflects the offences. If City survive, that is simply the consequence of their results.

It is different if the commission first decides City must be relegated and then works backwards to discover how many points need to disappear.

That would expose the sanction to an obvious challenge over proportionality.

City have already demonstrated their willingness to contest adverse regulatory decisions through every available legal route. The commission therefore needs a sanction it can explain offence by offence, not merely one producing a politically or emotionally satisfying final league table.

A very large deduction that destroys City’s title challenge, removes European qualification and leaves the club fighting to stay up may consequently be easier to defend than a deduction explicitly calibrated to guarantee 18th place.

It would also preserve an element of sporting uncertainty. City would receive the penalty; their remaining results would determine whether it actually relegated them.

That may sound like a fine distinction, but in a case likely to generate another round of legal challenges, fine distinctions have developed something of a career of their own.

City’s appeal could still change the calculation

All of this assumes that the core verdict survives.

City’s appeal is comprehensive, and the proceedings are private. If the Appeal Board overturns the central findings around disguised sponsorship funding and hidden expenditure, the justification for an extreme sporting sanction could shrink dramatically.

If the findings survive largely intact, the commission faces the opposite problem. It will then have to explain why conduct of this scale does not deserve a punishment substantially greater than those imposed in ordinary PSR cases.

The strongest central scenario remains a major points deduction, potentially combined with financial or other sanctions. The scale of the findings gives the commission room to impose a deduction large enough to threaten City’s Premier League status, but there is no tariff or precedent pointing naturally towards the number required to guarantee relegation.

Beginning in 2015, the Portuguese computer hacker behind Football Leaks obtained millions of confidential documents exposing contracts, tax arrangements and internal communications across European football. His files helped trigger investigations involving players, clubs and officials across several countries and included the Manchester City emails later published by Der Spiegel, which fed first UEFA’s investigation and then the Premier League’s case against the club.

But Portuguese authorities decided in July to end the special witness-protection arrangements he had received since 2020, after assessing the threat against him as low. Pinto was not informed until 30 September, 83 days later and only shortly before the decision was due to take effect. Portugal’s justice minister has since ordered a review of the situation.

Pinto says that assessment is utterly wrong. He says he has received death threats, fears an assassination attempt and intends to move to an undisclosed location. His lawyers have appealed the decision, while also pointing to an assault in Lisbon earlier this year as evidence that the risk has not disappeared.

The timing inevitably drew attention because Pinto learned of the decision almost immediately after Manchester City was found guilty of serious financial-rule breaches. But the decision itself had been made months earlier, and there is currently no evidence that City, its owners or anyone connected to the club caused Pinto’s protection to be withdrawn.

Nor is Pinto necessarily finished with the Manchester City story. He has indicated that he is prepared to cooperate with UK authorities if his security can be guaranteed, and reporting suggests he may possess additional City-related documents that were not examined during the Premier League investigation.

So what has actually happened to Pinto, how much danger is he in, and what role could he still play in the Manchester City case?

1. What did Football Leaks actually reveal?

Football Leaks was not primarily a Manchester City project. Between 2015 and 2018, Pinto shared 18.6 million documents online and with a consortium of European journalists. The archive contained contracts, emails and other confidential records from clubs, players, agents, lawyers and football organisations.

Some disclosures were about the enormous sums circulating through elite football. The leaks revealed salaries paid to players including Lionel Messi and Neymar and exposed contractual arrangements that clubs and players had previously kept private.

Others had much wider consequences. Documents distributed through Football Leaks helped journalists examine tax arrangements involving leading footballers and brought renewed attention to a lawsuit involving Cristiano Ronaldo, although that case was later dismissed by a US judge. Pinto also supplied material behind the separate Luanda Leaks investigation into the business empire of Isabel dos Santos.

Manchester City became one of Football Leaks’ most consequential subjects. Internal City material obtained by Pinto was passed to Der Spiegel and published from 2018, exposing emails about sponsorship funding and Financial Fair Play. Those disclosures helped trigger UEFA and later Premier League investigations.

Football Leaks therefore did not establish every allegation eventually made against the organisations it exposed. What it did was open a vast private archive that allowed journalists and regulators to start asking questions they previously could not.

2. Did Rui Pinto commit a crime?

Yes.

Pinto has described himself as a whistleblower, but Portuguese courts have also convicted him of crimes connected with the way he obtained and used confidential information.

He was arrested in Budapest in January 2019 and extradited to Portugal. During his first trial, Pinto admitted using illegal methods to obtain millions of documents. In September 2023, a Portuguese court convicted him of nine offences, including unauthorised access to computer systems, interception of correspondence and attempted extortion. He received a four-year suspended prison sentence.

The attempted-extortion conviction involved the Doyen Sports investment fund, which Pinto had approached while in possession of confidential information. That part of the case has always complicated the straightforward description of Pinto as a whistleblower: his conduct included not only acquiring and disclosing information but also an attempt to obtain money.

France also convicted Pinto over hacking emails belonging to Paris Saint-Germain executives, imposing a six-month suspended sentence in 2023.

But another enormous Portuguese prosecution ended very differently. In April 2026, Pinto was acquitted of 241 charges, including allegations that he illegally accessed emails belonging to Benfica, football bodies, lawyers, magistrates and the Portuguese tax authority. The court ruled the charges invalid because they covered conduct for which he had already been prosecuted, rather than finding that no hacking had taken place.

3. Why did Portugal decide to remove his protection?

By 2020, Pinto’s relationship with the Portuguese authorities had changed.

He had spent more than a year in pre-trial detention when he agreed to cooperate with investigators and gave them access to encrypted material containing millions of documents. The man Portugal was prosecuting was suddenly also giving prosecutors information they could use in cases involving other people.

That cooperation led to Pinto entering the protected-witness system. From August 2020, he lived at a confidential residence under arrangements designed to keep his location secret. The protection continued for years while investigators in Portugal and elsewhere worked with material from his archive.

Then, in July 2026, Portugal’s Commission for Special Security Programmes decided the exceptional measures were no longer necessary. Pinto was now considered at “low risk”.

We do not know much more than that. The assessment itself is not public. Portuguese authorities have not explained which threats they considered, why those threats were judged to have diminished, or what had changed since Pinto’s protection was last renewed.

Pinto did not learn about the decision when it was made. He was informed on 30 September, 83 days later, giving him little time to challenge the decision or make alternative arrangements. His lawyers say he was not heard before the commission reached its conclusion.

That delay has brought the decision under additional scrutiny. Justice minister Rita Alarcão Júdice has since ordered a review, meaning the argument is now not merely about whether Pinto remains at risk. It is also about how a six-year protection arrangement was brought to an end.

For now, Portugal’s official position is straightforward: Pinto no longer faces enough danger to justify this level of protection. What the authorities have not publicly shown is why.

4. Is Rui Pinto actually in danger?

There are two competing accounts.

Pinto says yes. Portuguese authorities say the current risk is low.

Pinto says he continues to receive death threats and believes someone may attempt to kill him. What has not been made public are the threats themselves or the intelligence used by Portuguese authorities to decide that they no longer justify special protection.

There is also the attack in April 2026.

Pinto was assaulted in Lisbon and left with a bruised eyebrow. Police were informed, although Pinto did not submit a formal complaint. Nobody has been publicly identified as his attacker and no motive has been established.

The assault cannot currently be attributed to Manchester City, Benfica, Doyen Sports or anybody else exposed by Football Leaks.

But his protected status also involved more than having police on hand. Pinto has been living at a secret address under arrangements intended to prevent people from finding him. Removing that protection changes where he can live, who knows his whereabouts and what security the Portuguese state will provide him.

5. Is any of this connected to Manchester City, and is Pinto still involved?

Pinto was told on 30 September that Portugal intended to end his special protection, almost immediately after the independent commission published its findings against Manchester City. Pinto had also been publicly celebrating the verdict and arguing that the Football Leaks material had finally been vindicated.

But the chronology rules out the simplest explanation. Portugal’s Commission for Special Security Programmes had made its decision in July, almost three months before the City verdict. There is no evidence that Manchester City, its ownership or anyone acting for the club influenced that decision.

But Pinto may still possess information about City that was not reviewed by authorities yet.

He has said through intermediaries that he is prepared to cooperate with UK authorities if they can guarantee his security.

5. Is any of this connected to Manchester City, and is Pinto still involved?

The timing was almost designed to encourage suspicion.

Manchester City had just suffered the biggest defeat of its long-running financial case when Pinto was told that Portugal was ending his protection. He was publicly celebrating the verdict and presenting it as vindication of the Football Leaks material that had first put City’s finances under sustained scrutiny.

But the dates matter more than the coincidence. Portugal’s security commission had made its decision in July, almost three months before the City verdict was published.

There is no evidence that Manchester City, Sheikh Mansour, club executives or anyone acting on their behalf influenced Portugal’s decision.

The same applies to Pinto’s April assault. Nobody has established who attacked him, and there is no evidence connecting it to Manchester City. A chronology can look sinister without proving a connection.

City nevertheless remains part of Pinto’s future because he may still possess material concerning the club.

Pinto has said through intermediaries that he is prepared to cooperate with UK authorities if they guarantee his security. Reporting suggests he may hold further Manchester City documents that were not examined during the Premier League investigation.

Pinto is also not a party to City’s appeal. The Football Leaks material helped start the regulatory process, but the Premier League conducted its own investigation and built its own case before the independent commission.

6. Why is Portugal protecting someone it also prosecuted?

Portugal arrested and prosecuted him because of the methods he used to obtain confidential information. In 2023 he was convicted of nine offences, including unlawful access to computer systems and attempted extortion.

But while that criminal case was developing, Pinto began cooperating with the authorities.

In 2020, he gave investigators access to encrypted drives containing millions of documents. Those files potentially contained evidence relevant to offences committed by people and organisations other than Pinto himself. Portuguese prosecutors and investigators in other European countries subsequently made use of material originating from his archive.

That created two separate legal relationships with the same person.

Portugal could prosecute Pinto for crimes he committed while obtaining information and, at the same time, treat him as a cooperating witness because the information he possessed could help investigate other crimes. One did not cancel out the other.

His entry into witness protection followed from the second role. The state concluded that his cooperation and the information he held exposed him to sufficient risk to justify extraordinary security measures.

The current dispute is therefore not about whether Portugal suddenly decided Pinto was innocent. It did not.

The question is narrower: whether a man who remains a source and potential witness in investigations generated by one of the largest caches of confidential material in European sport still faces enough danger to justify the protections he has received since 2020.

The Premier League brought its case against Manchester City Football Club Limited, not against any individual. The commission ultimately found the club guilty of the substantive financial charges and most of the allegations concerning its failure to cooperate with the investigation.

But understanding what happened means tracking the many people who are named in emails, contracts, and payments, who ran the club while those arrangements operated, who defended it before regulators, who gave evidence, and who represented sponsors.

So, from Sheikh Mansour and Pep Guardiola to Rui Pinto and the wonderfully named Lord Pannick, this is the Sports and Crime Briefing’s Who’s Who of the Manchester City case

Manchester City’s ownership, leadership and financial trail
Khaldoon Al Mubarak · Omar Berrada · Jorge Chumillas · Simon Cliff · Garry Cook · Martin “Marty” Edelman · John MacBeath · Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan · Simon Pearce · Ferran Soriano · Graham Wallace · Andrew Widdowson

Managers, players and agents
Pep Guardiola · Roberto Mancini · Enzo Maresca · Dimitri Seluk · Yaya Touré

Fordham, image rights and financial intermediaries
David Rowland · Jonathan Rowland

Abu Dhabi sponsors, officials and intermediaries
Omar Awad · Mohammad Harib · James Hogan · Jaber Mohamed

The people who exposed and investigated the case
Rui Pinto · Richard Masters · Sir Gary Hickinbottom · Murray Rosen KC

The earlier UEFA case
Rui Botica Santos · José da Cunha Rodrigues · Ulrich Haas · Gianni Infantino · Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall · Manfred Nan · Michel Platini

Manchester City’s lawyers
Paul Harris KC · Philip Marshall KC · Lord David Pannick KC

The Premier League’s lawyers
Andrew Hunter KC · Adam Lewis KC · Jason Pobjoy KC

Manchester City’s owners and leaders

Khaldoon Al Mubarak

Manchester City chairman since 2008; founding chairman of City Football Group

Khaldoon Al Mubarak has been the public face of Sheikh Mansour’s ownership almost from the beginning. He became chairman after the 2008 takeover and has since overseen City’s transformation from an ambitious Premier League club into the centrepiece of a global football group. His influence also extends well beyond football: he is chief executive of sovereign investor Mubadala and one of Abu Dhabi’s most senior business figures.

He has also been one of the club’s most persistent public defenders. When City first came under serious UEFA scrutiny, Al Mubarak repeatedly insisted that the club would ultimately be vindicated. That confidence became part of City’s public identity during the regulatory battles that followed.

Omar Berrada

Manchester United chief executive; formerly a senior City Football Group executive

Omar Berrada spent more than a decade inside Manchester City and City Football Group before making one of the most conspicuous executive moves in English football. He joined City from Barcelona in 2011, rose through its commercial structure and eventually became CFG’s chief football operations officer before crossing to United in 2024.

His City career spanned years in which CFG was expanding aggressively and the club’s financial model was coming under increasing regulatory scrutiny. By the time he left, Berrada had worked across both the commercial and football sides of the group, making him one of the most senior executives to emerge from the City system and go on to run one of its biggest rivals.

Jorge Chumillas

Former Manchester City and City Football Group chief financial officer

Jorge Chumillas’ emails offer a glimpse of senior City executives trying to understand how sponsorship money would actually reach the club.

In a 2013 exchange, he asked Simon Pearce to clarify whether additional funding would move through ADUG and Etihad before reaching City. Other correspondence drew distinctions between what sponsors themselves were contributing and money supplied from elsewhere in Abu Dhabi.

Those exchanges became important because the Premier League case turned on precisely that question: whether sponsorship income recorded as commercial revenue was genuinely being supplied by the named sponsors. Chumillas also appears in the Fordham correspondence, connecting him to another disputed financial structure.

Simon Cliff

City Football Group general counsel

Simon Cliff has been part of Manchester City’s legal architecture since the ownership changed hands. He advised ADUG on the 2008 acquisition, then joined the organisation permanently and ultimately became City Football Group’s general counsel.

His importance lies partly in the way City prepared for and fought regulation. Leaked correspondence from the early Financial Fair Play battles showed Cliff involved in internal discussions about how aggressively the club should respond to UEFA, including litigation strategy.

He also served as a director of the company that became Fordham Sports Image Rights.

Garry Cook

Manchester City chief executive, 2008–2011

Garry Cook became City chief executive just before the Abu Dhabi takeover and then helped oversee the first, extraordinarily rapid phase of the new ownership’s expansion. He was in charge as major sponsorship agreements were being built and as the club recruited the players and managers intended to turn investment into trophies.

His role becomes particularly important in the Roberto Mancini remuneration story. When Mancini’s lawyer sought changes to the manager’s Al Jazira consultancy agreement, she dealt with Cook, and the correspondence discussed those payments as part of Mancini’s wider compensation.

That documentary trail is why Cook matters to the case far more than simply because he held the chief executive title. The details later surfaced in reporting on the Mancini payments.

Martin “Marty” Edelman

City Football Group director and longtime adviser to the ownership

Martin Edelman has been part of the ownership’s senior circle since the early days of Sheikh Mansour’s takeover. An American lawyer and businessman, he joined City’s board in 2008 and later became a City Football Group director, while also advising Abu Dhabi-linked businesses outside football.

His connection to City extends well beyond football governance. Edelman has also been involved in Abu Dhabi-backed property investment in Manchester, including Manchester Life, linking the club’s ownership to the broader regeneration strategy around the Etihad campus.

John MacBeath

Manchester City director; interim chief executive, 2011–2012

John MacBeath briefly ran Manchester City during an important transitional period between Garry Cook’s departure and Ferran Soriano’s arrival. His time as interim chief executive falls squarely inside the years later examined by the commission.

His connection goes beyond chronology. Companies House records show that MacBeath became a director of the company later known as Fordham Sports Image Rights in May 2012, alongside Simon Cliff, before both resigned the following year.

Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan

Manchester City owner

Sheikh Mansour bought Manchester City in 2008 through Abu Dhabi United Group and immediately changed the scale of what the club could spend and build. In his first message to supporters after the takeover, he presented the investment as a long-term project rather than a short burst of spending, with Khaldoon Al Mubarak installed as chairman to oversee it.

The ownership funding later became central to the Premier League case. The commission concluded that hundreds of millions of pounds recorded as sponsorship revenue had actually been supplied by ADUG and that the ownership vehicle had also funded costs properly attributable to City.

Simon Pearce

Manchester City director; adviser within Abu Dhabi’s Executive Affairs Authority

Simon Pearce is one of the most important individual names in the documentary trail because he repeatedly appears where Manchester City, its sponsors and Abu Dhabi’s institutions intersect.

Leaked emails show senior City finance executives asking Pearce how much sponsors such as Etihad and Aabar would actually contribute and how additional money would be provided from Abu Dhabi-linked sources. Other exchanges place him close to transfers and internal discussions about how funding should be structured.

More recent reporting has again put Pearce near the centre of the funding arrangements involving ADUG, making him one of the most important figures for understanding how the money moved between ownership, sponsors and the club.

Ferran Soriano

Manchester City and City Football Group chief executive since 2012

Ferran Soriano arrived from Barcelona in 2012, inheriting a club already moving rapidly into the Financial Fair Play era. He subsequently became the executive architect of City Football Group’s global expansion while remaining chief executive through the investigations, hearing and verdict.

That long tenure means Soriano appears on both sides of the story. He was running the organisation while some disputed financial arrangements were still operating, and he later became one of its strongest defenders when regulators challenged them.

After the commission ruled against City, Soriano publicly rejected its reasoning and described the case as resting on a false theory, placing him firmly at the centre of the club’s post-verdict response.

Graham Wallace

Former Manchester City chief financial and operating officer

Graham Wallace was one of the executives responsible for Manchester City’s finances during the early years of Financial Fair Play, first as chief financial officer and later as chief operating officer.

His name matters particularly because of Roberto Mancini’s Al Jazira consultancy arrangement. In one leaked email, Wallace asked City finance staff to follow the usual process for sending money through ADUG so that Al Jazira could make a payment under Mancini’s consultancy structure.

That correspondence appears in the Mancini trail and places Wallace directly inside the administrative chain behind one of the most contested remuneration arrangements in the case.

Andrew Widdowson

Former Manchester City head of finance

Leaked correspondence shows him seeking Simon Pearce’s help in arranging payments connected to Abu Dhabi sponsors. In one exchange, he wrote that money needed to arrive through the “correct channels” rather than appear as separate sources of funding.

That phrase became particularly significant once regulators began trying to determine whether City’s reported commercial income reflected the true source of the money. Widdowson’s correspondence provides a rare glimpse of the day-to-day financial mechanics behind what later became a much larger regulatory battle.

Managers, players and agents

Pep Guardiola

Manchester City manager, 2016–2026

Pep Guardiola managed Manchester City for the final seasons covered by the Premier League’s financial case and remained in charge throughout most of the subsequent investigation.

He repeatedly defended the club publicly. In 2022, Guardiola said he had asked City’s hierarchy to tell him the truth about the allegations and that he would leave if lied to.

Guardiola left City in 2026, before the commission published its findings.

Roberto Mancini

Manchester City manager, 2009–2013

Roberto Mancini joined Manchester City in December 2009 and won the FA Cup in 2011 and Premier League in 2012.

Alongside his Manchester City employment contract, Mancini also held a consultancy agreement with Al Jazira in Abu Dhabi. The commission found that £8.866 million funded by ADUG represented liabilities belonging to Manchester City and should have been included in City’s accounts and remuneration reporting.

The arrangement and its tax implications have since been examined in detail through the leaked contracts and correspondence concerning the Mancini payments.

Enzo Maresca

Manchester City manager since 2026

Enzo Maresca previously coached Manchester City’s elite development squad and served as Pep Guardiola’s assistant during the club’s 2022–23 treble season.

City appointed him manager in June 2026 following Guardiola’s departure. The independent commission delivered its financial findings several months into Maresca’s first season in charge, leaving him managing the team while City pursued its appeal.

Dimitri Seluk

Former agent of Yaya Touré

Dimitri Seluk represented Yaya Touré for most of the midfielder’s Manchester City career.

When the Premier League announced its charges in 2023, reporting connected one player-remuneration allegation with Touré and Seluk. Seluk denied receiving undisclosed money and said that all payments involving him had been properly declared. His public denial followed publication of the Premier League charges.

Yaya Touré

Manchester City midfielder, 2010–2018

Yaya Touré joined Manchester City from Barcelona in 2010 and remained at the club until 2018.

Earlier reporting connected Touré and his then-agent Dimitri Seluk with allegations concerning player remuneration and image-rights payments. Seluk publicly denied that undisclosed payments had been made.

The 2026 commission decision redacts the identity of the player involved in its £7.4 million remuneration and image-rights findings. The published ruling therefore does not identify Touré as that player.

Fordham, image rights and financial intermediaries

David Rowland

British financier; controlling shareholder of Fordham Sports Image Rights

Manchester City transferred its player image-rights business to the company that became Fordham Sports Image Rights. City recorded a £24.5 million lump sum from the arrangement in its 2012–13 financial results.

Companies House identifies David Rowland as Fordham’s person with significant control, holding at least 75 per cent of its shares and voting rights and the right to appoint or remove directors.

The commission later examined City’s accounting for Fordham, including the treatment of income and the transfer of image-rights costs.

Jonathan Rowland

Financier; former Fordham director

Jonathan Rowland, David Rowland’s son, became a director of Fordham Sports Image Rights on 1 July 2013 and resigned on 2 January 2014.

The appointment came immediately after Simon Cliff and John MacBeath resigned as directors and after Manchester City Football Club (Image Rights) Limited was renamed Fordham Sports Image Rights. The company was ultimately dissolved in January 2024.

Abu Dhabi sponsors, officials and intermediaries

Omar Awad

Finance official within Abu Dhabi’s Executive Affairs Authority

Omar Awad appears in leaked emails dealing directly with transfers from ADUG accounts.

On 24 October 2013, Simon Pearce asked Awad to send £31.7 million to Manchester City from an ADUG sterling account. Later that day, Awad replied that the payment had been processed and subsequently arranged for City to receive the transfer confirmation.

Mohammad Harib

Etisalat executive

Mohammad Harib gave evidence during Manchester City’s earlier UEFA and CAS proceedings concerning the club’s Abu Dhabi sponsorship arrangements.

His evidence concerned Etisalat and the commercial basis of its relationship with Manchester City. The Etisalat sponsorship was among the arrangements examined during the earlier UEFA dispute and later returned to prominence in the Premier League proceedings.

James Hogan

Etihad Airways chief executive, 2006–2017

James Hogan was Etihad Airways chief executive when the airline became Manchester City’s shirt sponsor in 2009. He announced the original three-year deal alongside Garry Cook. 2009 sponsorship

Hogan later gave evidence for Manchester City during its 2020 CAS appeal. The CAS panel considered evidence from Hogan, Simon Pearce and other witnesses when examining how Etihad funded its sponsorship payments. CAS evidence

Jaber Mohamed

Former general director of Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Court

Jaber Mohamed is connected to two £15 million payments associated with Etisalat in 2012 and 2013.

Manchester City had previously described Mohamed to UEFA as a financial broker. Evidence examined during the later Premier League case identified him as the general director of Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Court.

His position has become part of City’s appeal arguments over whether some sponsorship funding came from ADUG or from Abu Dhabi government sources. The dispute over the two payments and City’s previous evidence to UEFA was detailed in reporting on the Mohamed payments. The Times

The people who exposed and investigated the case

Rui Pinto

Founder of Football Leaks

Rui Pinto founded Football Leaks in 2015 and supplied journalists with a large cache of confidential football documents.

Material obtained by Pinto formed the basis of Der Spiegel reporting on Manchester City’s sponsorship funding and Financial Fair Play arrangements and later featured in investigations by UEFA and the Premier League.

Pinto subsequently cooperated with European authorities while under Portuguese witness protection. Days after the 2026 City verdict, Reuters reported that his protection was due to end on 10 October.

Richard Masters

Premier League chief executive

Richard Masters has been Premier League chief executive since 2019 and headed the league throughout the latter stages of its Manchester City investigation, the independent-commission hearing and the publication of the verdict.

The league first charged City in February 2023. Masters continued to face public questions about the length of the proceedings, acknowledging in August 2026 that he understood frustration over the delay.

After the commission published its findings, Masters issued the Premier League’s response to the decision.

Sir Gary Hickinbottom

Chair of the Premier League Judicial Panel

Premier League clubs unanimously approved Sir Gary Hickinbottom as chair of the independent Judicial Panel in February 2025 for a five-year term.

Hickinbottom is a former Court of Appeal judge. Under Premier League rules, the chair of the Judicial Panel appoints members of the panel to independent commissions and Appeal Boards. judicial system

He succeeded Murray Rosen KC.

Murray Rosen KC

Former chair of the Premier League Judicial Panel

Murray Rosen KC was chair of the Premier League Judicial Panel when the Manchester City proceedings were initiated.

The Premier League has confirmed that Rosen held the position at the time of the complaint against City. Sir Gary Hickinbottom subsequently succeeded him in 2025. appeal process

The earlier UEFA case

Rui Botica Santos

President of the 2020 CAS panel

Rui Botica Santos chaired the three-member Court of Arbitration for Sport panel that heard Manchester City’s appeal against UEFA’s 2020 punishment.

UEFA had imposed a two-season ban from European competition and a €30 million fine. CAS overturned the ban and reduced the fine to €10 million, finding that some alleged breaches had not been sufficiently established while others were time-barred.

José da Cunha Rodrigues

Former chair of UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body adjudicatory chamber

José da Cunha Rodrigues chaired UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body adjudicatory chamber when it ruled against Manchester City in February 2020.

The chamber banned City from UEFA club competitions for two seasons and imposed a €30 million fine after finding serious breaches of Financial Fair Play rules and failures to cooperate with the investigation.

CAS later overturned the European ban and reduced the fine.

Ulrich Haas

CAS arbitrator

Ulrich Haas sat on both of Manchester City’s principal CAS proceedings against UEFA.

In 2019, he was a member of the panel that ruled City’s attempt to challenge UEFA’s referral of its case was premature. In 2020, he sat on the panel hearing City’s substantive appeal against UEFA’s sanctions.

Gianni Infantino

UEFA general secretary during City’s 2014 FFP settlement

Gianni Infantino was UEFA general secretary when Manchester City negotiated its first major Financial Fair Play settlement in 2014.

Football Leaks documents subsequently revealed discussions involving Infantino and City chief executive Ferran Soriano during the negotiations. Infantino later defended UEFA’s use of negotiated settlements with clubs facing FFP sanctions.

Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall

CAS arbitrator

Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall sat on Manchester City’s CAS panels in both 2019 and 2020.

He was therefore involved first in the procedural ruling rejecting City’s early challenge to UEFA’s referral and later in the appeal that overturned City’s two-season European ban.

Manfred Nan

President of the 2019 CAS panel

Manfred Nan chaired the CAS panel hearing Manchester City’s 2019 challenge to UEFA.

City attempted to appeal UEFA’s decision to refer the investigation to its adjudicatory chamber before a final sanction had been imposed. The panel dismissed the case as premature, requiring City to complete UEFA’s internal process first.

Michel Platini

UEFA president during the introduction of Financial Fair Play

Michel Platini was UEFA president when its executive committee approved the Financial Fair Play regulations in May 2010.

The regulations introduced financial requirements linking clubs’ expenditure more closely to their revenues and were phased into UEFA’s licensing system over the following seasons. Manchester City later reached a settlement with UEFA over FFP breaches in 2014.

Manchester City’s lawyers

Paul Harris KC

Senior counsel for Manchester City

Paul Harris KC led Manchester City’s legal team during its successful 2020 appeal against UEFA at the Court of Arbitration for Sport.

He subsequently continued to represent City in disputes involving the Premier League, including proceedings connected to the historical financial investigation and other challenges to league rules.

Philip Marshall KC

Counsel for Manchester City

Philip Marshall KC was part of Manchester City’s legal team during the independent-commission proceedings.

Marshall practises in commercial litigation, civil fraud and international disputes. He worked alongside Lord Pannick KC and Paul Harris KC in City’s defence during the financial case. His involvement was reported when the two sides’ legal teams were identified.

Lord David Pannick KC

Lead counsel for Manchester City

Lord David Pannick KC led Manchester City’s defence before the independent Premier League commission.

He had previously represented City in other disputes with the Premier League and was retained for the hearing into the historical financial charges, which began in September 2024. His role as City’s lead advocate was confirmed when the hearing began.

The Premier League’s lawyers

Andrew Hunter KC

Counsel for the Premier League

Andrew Hunter KC was part of the Premier League’s legal team prosecuting its financial case against Manchester City.

He worked alongside Adam Lewis KC and Jason Pobjoy KC during the independent-commission proceedings. The three were identified as members of the league’s legal team.

Adam Lewis KC

Leading counsel for the Premier League

Adam Lewis KC led the Premier League’s case against Manchester City before the independent commission.

He had already represented the Premier League in earlier proceedings concerning City’s compliance with the league investigation and the production of documents and information.

Jason Pobjoy KC

Counsel for the Premier League

Jason Pobjoy KC worked alongside Adam Lewis KC and Andrew Hunter KC for the Premier League during the Manchester City proceedings.

He had also represented the Premier League in other financial-regulation litigation, including proceedings arising from Everton’s breaches of the Profitability and Sustainability Rules.

On 29 September, an independent Premier League commission found that City had repeatedly presented a financial picture that did not reflect how hundreds of millions of pounds were actually entering and leaving the club. Owner funding was recorded as sponsorship income. Costs connected to managers and players were kept outside City’s accounts. An image-rights arrangement increased reported income while reducing expenditure. The Premier League says the distortions exceeded £900 million.

Those findings also changed the calculations used to test City against football’s spending rules. Once the commission recalculated the club’s finances, it found breaches of UEFA financial regulations and the Premier League’s own profitability and sustainability rules. City was separately found to have failed to cooperate fully with the investigation that began in December 2018, although one of the four main cooperation allegations was not proved.

The Premier League’s 2023 referral applied overlapping duties across successive seasons between 2009/10 and 2017/18. One financial arrangement could therefore produce several breaches: one in the accounts, another when those accounts were submitted, and further breaches when the same figures were used to assess compliance with spending limits. The published decision organises the case into four principal charges and a series of subcharges, rather than 115 unrelated episodes.

Manchester City disputes the findings and has appealed. Punishment is being considered separately.

So what, exactly, has Manchester City been found guilty of doing?

TLDR:

• City recorded hundreds of millions of pounds supplied by its owner as sponsorship income. The commission found that of £949.94 million recorded from Abu Dhabi sponsors, £830.69 million was actually funded by ADUG, Manchester City’s owner.

• City failed to disclose the full amount it was paying manager Roberto Mancini. The commission found £8.866 million of ADUG-funded payments that belonged among City’s own costs, including remuneration paid through a separate Abu Dhabi consultancy arrangement.

• City failed to disclose £7.4 million in remuneration and image-rights payments for a player. Those payments should have appeared both in the player’s contract and in City’s accounts. The published decision redacts the player’s identity, although earlier reporting linked the allegation to Yaya Touré and his agent Dimitri Seluk.

• City kept another £500,000 liability out of its accounts through a consultancy agreement. ADUG paid a debt that the commission found actually belonged to City; the individual involved remains redacted.

• City used the Fordham image-rights arrangement to make its finances look better from both directions. It recorded £24.5 million as operating income that the commission found should have been treated as owner funding, while leaving £49.414 million of City’s image-rights costs outside its operating expenses.

• City failed to disclose that important sponsorship agreements involved related parties. The commission found that the accounts did not properly reveal the connections behind the deals, information needed to understand how independent and commercially valuable those sponsorships really were.

• Once those figures were corrected, City failed UEFA’s Financial Fair Play rules for five consecutive seasons. The commission found substantial breaches from 2013/14 through 2017/18.

• City also breached the Premier League’s own spending limits in three consecutive seasons. After removing income and restoring costs that the commission said had been wrongly accounted for, City exceeded the permitted losses in 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18.

• City obstructed parts of the Premier League investigation. The commission found that the club failed to cooperate fully after the investigation began in December 2018, although the Premier League did not prove every cooperation allegation it brought.

1. Manchester City recorded owner funding as sponsorship income

A sponsorship payment and an investment by a club’s owner can both put money into the club. They do not count in the same way. Commercial sponsorship can be treated as income for the financial tests applied to clubs; an owner’s capital contribution cannot simply be presented as money generated by the business. The commission’s finding turned on the source of the money City received and how it was recorded.

The commission found that City devised a disguised funding scheme in early 2010. Abu Dhabi sponsors would agree to provide only part of the sum appearing in their sponsorship contracts. The balance would come from Abu Dhabi United Group Investment & Development Ltd, or ADUG, the club’s owner. City then recorded the full contractual amount as sponsorship revenue. The commission found that the accounts did not reflect who had actually supplied the money.

Across the nine seasons examined, City recorded £949.94 million in Abu Dhabi sponsorship revenue. The commission attributed £119.25 million to the sponsors themselves and £830.69 million to ADUG. City disputes those findings.

The commission described the relevant sponsorship agreements as shams, but did not rely on that conclusion alone. Even if the contracts were legally valid, it found that the owner-funded portion still had to be accounted for according to its economic substance. Money supplied by the owner did not become commercial sponsorship merely because it passed through an agreement bearing a sponsor’s name.

City submitted financial information to the Premier League season after season. The same funding arrangement therefore generated repeated breaches as the club continued to file accounts that the commission found misstated its revenue. It also found that City had breached its obligation to act in utmost good faith.

2 City failed to disclose millions of pounds it owed its manager, a player and others

The commission found three separate arrangements in which Abu Dhabi United Group paid liabilities that belonged to Manchester City, while the corresponding costs stayed out of the club’s accounts. Together they involved £16.766 million: £8.866 million connected to City’s manager at the time, Roberto Mancini, £7.4 million connected to a player’s remuneration and image rights, and a further £500,000 liability recorded through a consultancy agreement.

Roberto Mancini

Roberto Mancini’s case is the clearest example of what the Premier League said Manchester City was doing with remuneration because the arrangement was, in effect, split in two.

Mancini became City manager in December 2009. Manchester City paid him a reported basic salary of £1.45 million a year, before bonuses. At the same time, he had a second contract with Abu Dhabi club Al Jazira, worth another £1.75 million a year. For that second sum, the consultancy agreement required a minimum of just four days’ work annually.

The two jobs therefore looked very different on paper. Mancini was being paid £1.45 million to manage Manchester City through an entire Premier League season, while an Abu Dhabi club controlled, like City, by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan was paying him even more for a handful of consultancy days. The commission ultimately concluded that this was not really two economically separate jobs. The Al Jazira money was part of what it cost to employ Mancini at Manchester City.

Even the route taken by the money pulled the arrangement back towards City. Mancini did not initially sign the consultancy agreement in his own name. It was made through Sparkleglow Holdings Ltd, a Mauritius-registered company. But documents subsequently examined by Tax Policy Associates indicate that ADUG supplied the money behind the Al Jazira payments, while at least one Sparkleglow payment was made from a Manchester City bank account and authorised through City’s finance operation.

Nor did negotiations over the consultancy remain at arm’s length in Abu Dhabi. When Mancini’s lawyer sought changes to the arrangement in 2011, she dealt with Manchester City chief executive Garry Cook, rather than Al Jazira. The same documents show Cook discussing an additional payment connected to Mancini’s Italian tax position and treating the consultancy payment as part of Mancini’s wider compensation. The structure was later changed again, with payments moving from Sparkleglow to Italy International Services srl, an Italian company connected to Mancini’s lawyers.

By then, the distinction between “Manchester City salary” and “Al Jazira consultancy” had become increasingly difficult to sustain. City’s published accounts recorded the cost of the first contract. They did not record the second as a City expense, while the manager’s contract submitted under Premier League rules did not disclose it as part of his remuneration.

The independent commission, whose public decision redacts Mancini’s name, found £8.866 million in ADUG-funded payments across the four seasons covered by the manager-remuneration charge. It concluded that those payments were liabilities belonging to Manchester City and should therefore have appeared both in City’s accounts and, where required, in the manager’s employment terms. The commission called the underlying agreements shams. It also reached the same result without relying on that description: whatever the contracts said, their economic substance was that ADUG was paying part of Manchester City’s own bill.

That meant City had understated the cost of employing its manager for four consecutive seasons. It also meant the contract lodged with the Premier League did not show the full remuneration package that the commission found Mancini was receiving in connection with his City employment.

Mancini himself was not charged in the Premier League proceedings, and the commission did not make a finding of misconduct against him personally. When asked about the arrangement before the decision was published, he acknowledged the existence of the “double contract” but said any problem with it was Manchester City’s responsibility.

For City, however, the commission’s conclusion was much harder to compartmentalise: part of the cost of employing the manager who delivered the club’s first Premier League title had been paid through another Sheikh Mansour-controlled club and kept out of Manchester City’s disclosed remuneration and expenses. City rejects that finding and has appealed.

Yaya Touré (probably)

The commission does not name the player involved. But it does give us the dates: the arrangement ran for six seasons, from 2010/11 to 2015/16, beginning in the same season that Yaya Touré arrived from Barcelona and became one of the defining players of Manchester City’s rise.

Touré is not simply a convenient guess from the team sheet. When the Premier League brought its charges in February 2023, The Guardian reported that an allegation involving Touré’s then agent, Dimitri Seluk, and secret payments from City was understood to be among them. Seluk represented Touré throughout the period covered by the charge.

The commission has now found that an unnamed player arrangement involved £7.4 million supplied by a company named ADUG to meet liabilities that actually belonged to Manchester City. Those payments included remuneration and image-rights money that should have appeared in the player’s City contract. The corresponding expense should also have appeared in City’s accounts.

Image rights allow a footballer’s commercial value to be separated from his salary. A club can pay a player for playing football and separately pay for the right to exploit his name, image and commercial appeal. There is nothing inherently improper about that. The problem found by the commission was that the money was part of City’s financial obligation to the player while being paid outside the remuneration City disclosed.

The commission concluded the very agreements used to structure the payments were shams.

Seluk denied that anything had been hidden. Asked in 2023 whether City had made secret payments to him while he represented Touré, he said everything was transparent and said Touré had paid the required tax. He also said he would give the same account to the independent commission if asked.

Touré and Seluk have not been charged.

£500,000 hidden in a consultancy agreement

The third remuneration arrangement involved less money, but followed the same pattern. Manchester City owed £500,000 to an unnamed individual. ADUG paid it instead, while the cost appeared in a consultancy agreement between other parties rather than as an expense in City’s accounts.

The commission found that the consultancy agreement was a sham. City was the party that really owed the £500,000, ADUG had discharged that liability on its behalf.

Even if the consultancy agreement was legally genuine, its economic substance was unchanged: City had incurred a £500,000 cost, somebody else had paid it, and the expense had disappeared from the club’s reported figures.

The commission found that City consequently understated its expenditure for the season involved. It also concluded that the club knew its accounts did not give a true and fair picture of its finances, or was reckless as to whether they did, contributing to the finding that City had breached its duty to act in utmost good faith.

Unlike the Mancini arrangement, however, the published decision gives almost nothing from which the person can safely be identified. It redacts the individual who received the money, the other party to the consultancy agreement and even the season in which the payment was made. The detailed evidence sits in Appendix 18, which has not been published.

Across the three remuneration arrangements, the commission found £16.766 million of costs that belonged to City but were paid by ADUG and left outside the club’s reported expenditure.

3 City used Fordham to book £24.5 million as income while leaving £49.4 million of costs outside its accounts

The Fordham arrangement did something the earlier remuneration schemes did not. It improved Manchester City’s reported finances from both directions at once.

City had agreements giving it rights over the commercial use of its players’ images. In 2012, as part of a wider initiative called Project Longbow, the club began restructuring those rights. The idea behind Longbow was broader than Fordham and the commission accepted that much of the project was legitimate. The problem was the particular structure ultimately used for the image-rights business.

Fordham acquired City’s interests in its players’ image rights. City then recorded £24.5 million from the arrangement as operating income.

That made the transaction look like City had sold a valuable commercial asset to an outside business and earned £24.5 million from doing so.

The commission found something very different had happened.

ADUG, Manchester City’s owner, was funding the arrangement. The £24.5 million City recorded as commercial income should instead have been treated as an owner contribution. The sale had therefore allowed money originating with City’s ownership to appear in the accounts as money generated by the club’s business.

The other half of Fordham was even larger.

Players continued to be owed payments for their image rights. City treated Fordham as having taken those liabilities with the rights it had acquired. The commission disagreed. It found that £49.414 million in image-rights costs remained obligations belonging to Manchester City and should therefore have appeared among the club’s operating expenses.

Fordham consequently transformed City’s accounts twice. A transaction funded by the owner produced reported operating income, while almost £50 million of costs that the commission regarded as City’s own disappeared from operating expenditure.

Put those two findings beside each other and the attraction of the structure becomes obvious without needing to speculate about anyone’s motives. City’s reported revenue went up. Its reported costs went down. Both movements improved the financial numbers on which football’s spending rules would later operate.

The commission traced Fordham back to Project Longbow, launched in the third quarter of 2012 as City looked for ways to increase revenue and reduce losses. That context has to be handled carefully. Longbow was not itself found to be some giant fraudulent project. The commission expressly accepted that many of the ideas developed through it were legitimate commercial exercises. Fordham was the part it found crossed the line.

The club’s legal and commercial machinery also mattered. Fordham was not a loose payment arrangement of the kind seen with Mancini. It was a corporate structure designed to move a whole category of commercial rights and liabilities away from City. That made it potentially more consequential: instead of concealing one person’s remuneration, it altered how a sizeable part of the club’s image-rights business appeared in the accounts.

The commission ultimately found inaccurate accounting and a breach of City’s duty of utmost good faith. City disputes those conclusions.

4. City didn’t disclose key sponsorship deals that involved related parties

Charge 1(D) asked another question: what did Manchester City tell anyone reading its accounts about the relationships behind those sponsorship deals?

Not enough, according to the commission.

Accounting rules require companies to identify certain transactions involving people or organisations connected to them. A sponsorship deal negotiated with a genuinely independent company is different from one involving a company connected to the club’s ownership. That does not automatically make the second deal improper, but it changes how somebody assessing the accounts should understand it.

The commission found that City’s relevant sponsorship agreements were related-party transactions. City’s accounts either failed to disclose those relationships or failed to explain them sufficiently for readers to understand their financial effect.

That is more consequential than a missing footnote.

City’s sponsorship income was one of the central measures of how rapidly the club had grown commercially after Sheikh Mansour’s takeover. The accounts presented sponsorship agreements as revenue generated through City’s commercial business.

If the sponsor was connected to the ownership, anyone judging the independence, value or substance of that revenue needed to know.

City’s state of mind produced a separate finding. The commission concluded that the club knew the required disclosures were missing, or was reckless as to whether they were, contributing to another breach of its obligation to act in utmost good faith.

The sponsorship findings therefore operate on two levels. City was found to have misrepresented the source of hundreds of millions of pounds, and separately to have failed to disclose relationships that would have helped readers understand the nature of the deals generating that supposed commercial revenue.

City is appealing both findings.

5. It repeatedly failed UEFA’s spending rules

Between 2013/14 and 2017/18, Premier League rules required City to comply with UEFA’s financial regulations as a condition of membership. The league charged City with breaching that obligation in five consecutive seasons.

At the time, UEFA’s Financial Fair Play system revolved around a break-even calculation. Clubs could spend heavily, but their relevant football income and expenditure had to remain within prescribed losses over a monitoring period.

Manchester City’s published figures showedone financial position. The commission’s findings produced another.

The commission removed sponsorship income that it concluded was actually owner funding. It restored remuneration and image-rights expenses that City had left outside the accounts. It reversed the accounting treatment of Fordham. It then applied UEFA’s break-even rules to the revised figures.

City failed, by what the commission described as substantial amounts in every one of the five seasons charged.

Because the sponsorships involved related parties, the commission concluded that their value would have to be adjusted to fair market value. Once it made those adjustments, City still failed UEFA’s financial requirements.

This charge is sometimes blurred with the UEFA case that ended at the Court of Arbitration for Sport in 2020. They are not the same proceeding.

6. City breached the Premier League’s spending limits in three consecutive seasons

The Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules, or PSR, limited the losses a club could record over a rolling three-year period. The relevant threshold was £105 million, although that figure was calculated from adjusted earnings rather than simply measuring how much money a club spent on transfers.

Using Manchester City’s reported accounts, the club appeared to remain within the relevant limits for 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18.

The commission’s findings:
- removed sponsorship income that it had found was actually funded by ADUG;
- restored remuneration and image-rights costs that belonged to City but had been paid elsewhere;
- reversed the accounting treatment of Fordham.

When those corrected figures were run through the Premier League’s financial rules, the commission found that City had exceeded the permitted losses by substantial amounts in all three charged seasons.

7. City obstructed parts of the Premier League investigation

The final part of the case concerns what City did once the league started trying to find out what had happened.

The investigation began in December 2018, after the publication of internal City material by Der Spiegel and Football Leaks, and continued until the Premier League referred the case to an independent commission in February 2023.

Premier League clubs are required to provide documents, information and assistance when the league investigates suspected rule breaches. The commission found that City did not fully comply with those obligations and had attempted to frustrate parts of the investigation.

Al-Khelaifi was then president of Paris Saint-Germain, a member of the Ligue 1 board and chairman of beIN Media Group, owner of beIN Sports.

So, to clarify, he presided over the country’s biggest club that would receive money from the sale, he helped oversee the league itself, and he was chairman of a prospective buyer.

Investigators are now examining whether he used those overlapping positions to favour beIN, according to L’Équipe.

On 20 September, the Paris prosecutor’s office confirmed to AFP that a preliminary investigation had opened in April following a complaint by the anti-corruption association Anticor. Al-Khelaifi’s lawyer responded that his client had always acted independently, impartially and objectively.

So what happened exactly?

By July 2024, French clubs were running out of time to secure the television income they needed for the coming season. Amazon was not renewing its €250 million-a-season agreement, and Vincent Labrune, president of the Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP), had spoken of broadcasting revenues exceeding €1 billion. The offers available fell well short of that ambition. Days before the meeting, some clubs were expressing fears of bankruptcy.

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It asks the committee to investigate Gianni Infantino for alleged breaches of FIFA’s ethics code and to ban him for two years.

Full disclosure: I signed it. I support it. I doubt it will change anything.

Two days before the complaint arrived, FIFA had confirmed that Infantino would stand for re-election at the FIFA Congress in Rabat in March 2027. “Of course, nothing has changed,” a spokesperson said.

The petition serves as yet another public rejection of Infantino, all of which may eventually topple him.

But for the moment, FIFA has already explained its stance on this pressure. “Those who do not have the support of FIFA’s Member Associations should not seek to achieve through allegation, insinuation or misinformation what they cannot achieve through FIFA’s established democratic processes,” it wrote in an August 8 statement.

The organisation’s position is straightforward: Infantino’s authority comes from its 211 member associations, and any attempt to remove him must ultimately pass through them.

Infantino is comfortable meeting his critics on that specific battlefield. The doomed FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE) collapsed, but was intended to put millions in member associations’ pockets.

His relationships with individual members are what Infantino is banking on to save his job.

When the leaders of UEFA, the AFC and Concacaf turned against him, he specifically did not treat the confederations as unified electoral blocs. Their presidents can challenge him, but they cannot cast the ballots of the national associations beneath them.

And his moves over the last month show exactly that.

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However, evidence to support such a claim is hard to find.

“At the moment we have situations where vulnerable nineteen-year-olds come from Sudan to play in domestic soccer leagues, or in the under nineteens, and they are targeted for match fixing by overseas operators,” Minister Wells told a room full of journalists in late August.

This article was written by Tracey Holmes and originally published in The Sports Ambassador. Across Substack and her podcast, Tracey does an outstanding job at holding sports authorities to account. It is republished here with her kind permission and I encourage you to subscribe and support her work.

When asked by The Sports Ambassador podcast, none of the major football organisations working in governance, delivery of competition, integrity, and player representation were aware of such specific ethnic targeting in t…

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This averts the immediate confrontation of a civil war between FIFA and its richest confederation.

At a meeting in Monaco on 27 August, UEFA will tell its member associations that FIFA has met the conditions for ending the boycott and that UEFA members will participate in the U-20 Women’s World Cup in Poland, beginning on 5 September.

But among online discussions, this decision is being equated to letting Infantino off the hook. In recent days, UEFA and Concacaf had discussed a joint Nations League, outside FIFA’s jurisdiction. which would move more international matches and their commercial rights under the control of the regional bodies.

Infantino, meanwhile, seemingly crashed a visit to the Caribbean Football Union in the Dominican Republic to …

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Ten years on, Infantino is fighting to keep his career. His plan to operate the World Cup and FIFA’s main commercial operations through FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE) met with revolt.

With three confederations, half of the six that make up FIFA, calling for his head, Infantino removed FFE and has apologised for the plan. However, he has defended FFE’s core goals and refused to resign from his position as FIFA President.

The opposition to him is broad. UEFA, AFC and CONCACAF, representing European, Asian and North American football, refuse to drop their threatened boycott of FIFA competitions until Infantino is gone.

But CAF and Conmebol (Africa and South America) remain firmly on his side, as do many member nations, especially smaller ones who have seen their revenues skyrocket during Infantino’s tenure.

World leaders are similarly divided. Canada’s Mark Carney and the UK’s Andy Burnham have called for Infantino to go, while Trump, who received a FIFA Peace Prize from the Italian executive, has defended him to the hilt.

But the immediate dispute may now reach further back. UEFA’s lawyers may go back to the beginnings of Infantino’s career.

The immediate dispute may now reach further back. UEFA’s lawyers have demanded that 18 FIFA officials, including Infantino, preserve material about FFE to be used in potential future proceedings. The Telegraph has reported that UEFA is also considering a full review of Infantino’s 16 years spent atop European then world football.

So we went digging. The list of allegations is not a continuous corruption case, it is incredibly varied. It is also not meant to be a ruling on Infantino’s guilt or innocence, but as a journey through a career riddled with a surprisingly consistent stream of allegations of corruption, cronyism, and governance clashes.

We initially found 76 separate controversies. We narrowed them down to 45 as instances of related behavior were combined. Sometimes, matters that came out in the same scandal were separated when they tackled unrelated issues. Where possible, we have always sought to include Infantino or FIFA’s statements about the case.

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National associations are also beginning to abandon him in public. The Dutch federation said it saw no future under Infantino and had lost confidence in his leadership. Germany’s DFB had already refused to support his re-election and is now accusing him of acting unilaterally and irresponsibly. England’s FA backed a full review of FIFA’s leadership and governance.

The knives are coming out inside FIFA. Infantino’s senior adviser Carlos Cordeiro resigned in protest, disowned any involvement in FFE and called it “a bad deal for football”. Chief operating officer Kevin Lamour said senior staff had been deceived and described FFE as one man’s project.

These attempts predate FFE, with the Guardian reporting that moves to call the emergency meeting were “already under way” after FIFA lifted Folarin Balogun’s World Cup suspension following several calls involving Donald Trump.

Yet against all of that, a small cluster of federation presidents has chosen an odd line of defense.

They accept Infantino was wrong about FFE.

But they seem to think admitting he was wrong is itself the achievement and is proof that he is fit to remain in office. And much of this campaign feels oddly coordinated.

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More than 200 of FIFA’s 211 member associations had reportedly endorsed him ahead of the vote in Rabat on 18 March 2027. No challenger had declared. He had already been returned unopposed by acclamation in Paris in 2019 and again in Kigali in 2023.

Three days ago, the coronation ended.

On 28 July, FIFA proposed FIFA Forward Enterprise, a commercial subsidiary that would house the business and event operations of the World Cup and other FIFA competitions, with a minority stake sold to private investors. Joshua Kushner’s investment vehicle was expected to lead the transaction. FIFA gave all 211 associations until 19 September to decide whether to participate, with tens of millions of dollars in additional funding attached to acceptance.

Europe answered first. On 30 July, all 55 UEFA associations rejected the plan and threatened to boycott every FIFA competition while it remained alive.

“The soul and governance of football are not assets to trade,” UEFA said. “It is not FIFA’s to sell.”

Then Concacaf turned. Its 41 associations across North America, Central America and the Caribbean rejected FFE too.

In Asia, the AFC said it had not been consulted and accused FIFA of bypassing the established channels of football governance.

Africa, Latin America and Oceania have been more cautious, promising review and consultation.

Now, the language has turned. Media reports say that Infantino may have scuppered his chances at re-election.

But while Infantino’s presidency is under its greatest pressure, it is not close to being over.

The reason is that Infantino has spent the last decade building a patronage system where those who support him have serious financial incentives to do so.

Will Infantino Fall? Not Yet

Football associations are rebelling against Infantino’s FFE proposal. They have not yet rebelled against Infantino.

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The chair of the English Football Association is also one of FIFA’s eight vice-presidents. Yet, according to the FA, she and her organisation were “completely unaware” that Infantino was preparing to place FIFA’s commercial future inside a new $20 billion company and sell part of it to private investors.

Nine days after the final, FIFA publicly announced FIFA Forward Enterprise, or FFE. One day later, The Times revealed that the 211 associations which must support the plan have until September 19 to decide.

That gives them 53 days to consider a company that would combine FIFA’s broadcasting, sponsorship, ticketing and licensing businesses with the operational delivery of its men’s, women’s and youth tournaments.

I broke down the numbers behind this worrying proposal for the Sports and Crime Briefing yesterday (and incidentally wrote the 2nd most-read article in the history of the newsletter!)

No asset list, independent valuation, shareholder agreement or detailed governance structure has been published. FIFA has not explained whether FFE would own its commercial rights or license them, how long the arrangement would last, what rights investors would receive or how they could sell their interests.

But yet, members have 53 days and counting to approve.

An Artificially Close Deadline

Infantino’s letter tells the associations that “the decision on whether or not to proceed with this proposal belongs entirely to you”.

Does it really?

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That same day, Russia launched one of its largest combined attacks of the war on Ukraine. Ukrainian Olympic skeleton athlete Vladyslav Heraskevych counted the barrage on X: 600 drones and 90 missiles. “It’s sad to see childhood legends turn into moral bankrupts for whom nothing is more valuable than Russian rubles,” he wrote. “Shame.”

Pirlo rejected any political reading of the day. “We came exclusively for sport and for the children,” he said. “Football has the unique power to bring people together, to overcome borders and to offer a moment of joy, especially to young kids who dream of becoming footballers.”

Two months later, Pirlo’s job as an ambassador for Fonbet helped sabotage the most important coaching appointment in Italian football.

How close was Pirlo to the job?

Seemingly one signature away. After Pep Guardiola declined, technical director Paolo Maldini and advisor Leonardo settled on Pirlo, with Italian media reporting a four-year contract to the 2030 World Cup at no more than €1.5 million a season plus bonuses tied to Euro 2028 qualification. His backroom staff was already assembled, with Roberto Baronio lined up as his deputy. His agent Tullio Tinti had begun the paperwork to free him from his club, United FC Dubai. The announcement was expected around the FIGC Federal Council of July 28.

What exactly happened?

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The diagnosis, delivered to camera, was that Kane was suffering from magia negra (black magic), mal de ojo (the evil eye) and mala energía (black energy).

The segment went viral in late June, shortly after the World Cup began.

But the ritual had not originated in Peru. It was intended to reverse a curse supposedly placed on Kane some 4,000 miles away, in a shrine town in Ghana’s Ashanti Region.

Spain are world champions. But the 2026 World Cup was shadowed by a different game: traditional priests, curanderos, seers, shamans, witch doctors, tarotists and self-styled prophets attaching curses, blessings and predictions to almost every match. This article is Part One of a new Sports and Crime Briefing investigative series diving deep into these fraud schemes, how they are monetised, and how social media clicks are turned into paying customers.

How a curse crossed two continents

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Campaz, who had scored on his World Cup debut against Uzbekistan three weeks earlier, blazed the shot over the bar.

And while Campaz converted his penalty in the shootout, it didn’t matter and Colombia went out 4-3.

On the evening of July 8, a charter carrying the Colombian squad left Vancouver for Bogotá, landing at around 3 a.m. Colombia time. National icon James Rodríguez was on board, as were his teammates.

Campaz was absent.

The next morning, journalist Camilo Pinto revealed how Campaz's social media had been flooded with abuse since the final whistle.

Among the messages, one stood out.

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“In light of the decision taken on Sunday to suspend the implementation of an automatic one-match suspension, we feel that it is time for European Football Associations, all of whom are member associations of FIFA, to intervene and ask that FIFA investigate the aforementioned decision-making processes,” they wrote.

It is one of the most concerted moves any European institution has made against a sitting FIFA president.

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The governor climbed aboard. The Netherlands was set to play Morocco in Monterrey, the capital of Nuevo León.

“Muy contento,” he posted on social media, “se me cumplió el sueño de subirme al Orange Bus.” (Very happy, I fulfilled my dream of climbing onboard the Orange Bus.”

The stunt on the Oranjebus was framed as a politician doing a PR coup by welcoming foreign supporters to his country and state.

But García, a Mexican presidential hopeful, is now in a spot of bother.

Why is he in trouble?

García had wanted this fixture for months. Back in January, he bet the equivalent of his monthly salary that the Netherlands would play in Monterrey.

He declared match day a public holiday, closing schools and non-essential offices. He arranged for free beer, cabrito and tacos to be handed out across Parque Fundidora and the Macroplaza, and booked Enrique Iglesias to perform.

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It is the latest chapter in a ticketing saga that had been unfolding for eight months, one that has drawn subpoenas from two American attorneys general, an investigation in Texas, a letter signed by 69 members of Congress, a formal complaint to the European Commission and a public rebuke from a sitting US president who is one of Gianni Infantino’s closest allies.

The Sports and Crime Briefing has told the whole story, from the beginning, of how FIFA, with an assist from the White House, became a tout.

The first World Cup with dynamic pricing

The 2026 World Cup is the first at which FIFA has applied variable, demand-based pricing to match tickets. The model will be familiar to anyone who has tried to buy a concert ticket in America in recent years. Prices float as demand pushes them up, and there is no ceiling.

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By the time Laurent Nuñez, the Interior Minister, faced the cameras on the morning of 31 May, the national bill was 890 people arrested, 480 of them in the Paris area, and 57 police and gendarmes injured. One man was dead, killed in a motocross accident on the edge of the celebrations.

The Paris prosecutor logged roughly half the charges as being for assault on police. Splinter groups had, in the prefecture’s own word, “systematically” torched cars, looted shops and lit fires across the city. A bakery and a restaurant near the Parc des Princes were left structurally damaged. A crowd tried to storm a police station in the 8th arrondissement. The ring road encircling the city was briefly blockaded before tactical units cleared it.

It was, almost to the letter, a rerun. A year earlier, PSG’s first Champions League title had produced a worse night: two dead, around 192 injured, more than 500 arrested and 264 vehicles burned. The 2026 arrest count was up 32% on that. Two summers, two trophies, two near-identical nights of disorder in the same streets.

The reason this should not be reported as a shock is that nobody involved treated it as one. The violence was prepared for, in detail, on both sides of the barricade.

How Paris prepared

To understand why Paris ringed itself with police this year, you have to go back to the night a year earlier and to the warnings the city had already been given even before that.

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On April 29, Arsenal and Atlético Madrid drew 1-1 in the first leg of their Champions League semi-final. The night before, Kagame had taken in the other semi-final Parc des Princes, where Paris Saint-Germain beat Bayern Munich 5-4, seated between Nasser Al-Khelaïfi and a former French president.

Every team in the last four of the Champions League football carried some form of Visit Rwanda marking, on sleeves, training kits, perimeter boards or backdrops. Rwandan media called it “the Visit Rwanda Derby.”

The semi-finals were the high-water mark of a strategy that began in 2018, when Arsenal sold its first sleeve patch to the Rwanda Development Board on a deal SportsPro reports was worth £10 million (US$13.5 million) a year.

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